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NOTES
CITY OF NATIONAL CITY V. WIENER: THE
FURTHER EROSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS FOR ADULT BUSINESSES
L INTRODUCTION
The constitutional right of freedom of speech' protects the expres-
sion of non-obscene, adult erotic entertainment and businesses.2 This
constitutional protection has enabled adult entertainment to become one of
the nation's growth industries In the 1950s and '60s, adult businesses
began establishing themselves in large numbers in commercial and business
districts left vacant by migration to the suburbs.4  In recent years, these
businesses have begun to encroach upon middle-class, residential neighbor-
hoods.5 In response, municipalities have turned to their zoning power in
an effort to restrict the establishment of adult businesses.6 Since the early
part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
zoning constitutes a legitimate function of a state's police power.'
Municipalities provided as rationale, in part, that adult businesses increased
1. The First Amendment to the Constitution states that 'Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. L The First Amendment is made
applicable to state governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
3. Norman Marcus, Zoning Obscenity: Or, The Moral Politics of Porn, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 1,
4, 8 (1978). In 1965, for example, there were nine adult businesses in New York City. By 1976,
the number had jumped to 245. Id. at 8. While there are no current, overall statistics, midtown
Manhattan alone has experienced an increase in adult video stores from 5 to 25 in the past three
years. Marvine Howe, West Side Group Pressures City to Put Zoning Limits on X-Rated Shops,
N.Y. TAEs, Jan. 17, 1993, at 31.
4. Virginia M. Giokaris, Zoning and the First Amendment: A Municipality's Power to Control
Adult Use Establishments, 55 UMKC L. REv. 263, 267 (1987).
5. Rose Kim & Elaine Rivera, Neighborhood Porn Wars; Residents Turn Up Heat On Local
Smut Merchants, NEWSDAY, Apr. 18, 1993, at 6.
6. Giokauis, supra note 4, at 270.
7. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926).
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crime, disrupted residential areas, and lowered property values in the
community!
Thus, conflicts often arise between a community's right to provide
for the social welfare of its citizens and the First Amendment right of the
owners of adult businesses. In the last two decades, however, the law has
witnessed a steady erosion of constitutional protections as applied to adult
businesses, allowing some municipalities to take legitimate exercises of
police power and manipulate them so as to destroy the commercial viability
of adult businesses.9
City of National City v. Wiener,"0 a case recently decided by the
California Supreme Court, illustrates the extent of this erosion. Basing its
decision on two U.S. Supreme Court cases-Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc." and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.'1 -- the California
court upheld a restrictive ordinance that essentially precludes any adult
business from opening up within National City.
This Note analyzes the reasoning of the California Supreme Court,
arguing that the court inappropriately applies the precedent set by the U.S.
Supreme Court by failing to adequately respond to certain distinctions
between National City's ordinance and those at issue in Young and
Renton.3 This Note also argues that the court improperly finds that
National City's ordinance provides reasonable alternate avenues of
communication, 4 and that the court incorrectly interprets the economic
analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Renton."5 Finally, this Note
suggests that the Ninth Circuit's approach to the precedent set by Renton
offers a much more fair and workable test as to whether a city provides
reasonable alternate avenues of communication. 6
8. Charles H. Clarke, Freedom of Speech and the Problem of the Lawful Harmful Public
Reaction: Adult Use Cases of Renton and Mini Theatres, 20 AKRON L. REV. 187, 192-93 (1986).
9. Gianni P. Servodidio, The Devaluation of Nonobscene Eroticism as a Form of Expression
Protected by the First Amendment, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1231, 1236 (1993).
10. 838 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1992).
11. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
12. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
13. See infra notes 101-18 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 119-47 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 175-98 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Court's Traditional Approach to
Claims of First Amendment Violations
The Court has traditionally taken a two-track approach toward
regulations that restrict expression protected under the First Amendment.
1 7
Under the first track, regulations designed to limit communications which
convey dangerous messages or produce harmful effects are considered
content-based restrictions.s Examples include laws that prohibit seditious
libel or forbid the hiring of teachers advocating the violent overthrow of the
government.' 9
In this instance, the Court first determines whether the speech
occupies a subordinate position on the scale of First Amendment values.2"
Although obscene material is considered subordinate speech, the Court has
determined that only the most explicit, hard-core materials can be labeled
obscene.21 If the Court finds the speech to be subordinate, the Court
adopts a very deferential view of a statute's constitutionality.' But if the
speech is not deemed subordinate, the Court accords it virtually absolute
protection.73
Under the second track, regulations which limit expression without
consideration of its content or its communicative impact are considered
content-neutral restrictions.24 Some examples are laws that restrict noisy
speeches near hospitals or ban all billboards in residential neighbor-
hoods.' Although the Court has applied varying standards of review,
once the Court determines that a statute is content-neutral, its review is
often highly deferential. 26 The regulation will be upheld if it rationally
furthers a stated government interest.27
17. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTFUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d ed. 1988).
18. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Ci. L. REV. 46, 47 (1987).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1973). Areas where the courts have had little
trouble identifying material as obscene include bestiality, flagellation, sadomasochism and extreme
violence. Servodidio, supra note 9, at 1234-35.
22. Stone, supra note 18, at 47.
23. Id. at 48. The Court has invalidated almost every content-based restriction in the past 30
years. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Stone, supra note 18, at 50.
27. Id.
1994]
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Two cases are especially important in demonstrating the Court's
second track approach to content-neutral restrictions. In United States v.
O'Brien,' the Court sustained the defendant's conviction for burning his
draft card. 9 The Court rejected the defendant's First Amendment chal-
lenge, holding that Congress' purpose in prohibiting draft card burning was
designed not to suppress free speech, but merely to promote an efficient
administration of the draft.1 The incidental restriction on expression was
justified by the government's important interest in draft administration.
3'
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,32 the Court
upheld a prohibition of overnight camping in a national park against
campers demonstrating on behalf of the plight of the homeless. The Court
did not apply the O'Brien test but instead held the law to be a reasonable
"time, place, and manner" restriction.33 The Court held that the govern-
ment had a substantial interest in maintaining its parks and, except for
preventing overnight camping, the restriction left the right to demonstrate
intact.
34
B. Alteration of the Law by Young and Renton
1. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.
The first serious change in analyzing ordinances restricting First
Amendment protections as applied to adult businesses occurred in Young
v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.35 The city of Detroit had enacted several
28. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
29. Id at 385.
30. Id at 381-82. The Court in O'Brien employed a four-part test. A regulation is
sufficiently justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the government; [2] if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.
I& at 377.
31. Id at 378-80.
32. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
33. 1d at 293. Restrictions are valid under this test so long as they are "[1] justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech. [2] that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and [3] that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information." Id.
34. I& at 295-96.
35. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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"Anti-Skid Row" ordinances prohibiting "X-rated" theaters within 500 feet
of residential areas and 1000 feet of each other. 6 The ordinances
effectively spread such establishments throughout the city because studies
showed that "some uses of property are especially injurious to a neighbor-
hood when they are concentrated in limited areas."37
The plurality opinion written by Justice Stevens 38 conceded that the
ordinances were content-based39 but stated that "society's interest in
protecting this type of expression [erotic materials] is of a wholly different,
and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate."'4"
Thus, Justice Stevens seemed to add non-obscene but sexually explicit
materials to the list of subjects in a subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values.
However, even though Young certainly struck a blow to First
Amendment protections for adult businesses, it was not the "'green light'
sought by local political interests anxious to bring these uses under
control."4' Justice Stevens still accepted that, since the ordinances were
content-based, the appropriate standard for review is a test of close
scrutiny,"' even though he relaxed that standard a bit. Also, he correctly
observed, "[v]iewed as an entity, the market for this commodity is essen-
tially unrestrained. ' 43
2. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.
In 1986, in Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,4 the Supreme Court
went far beyond the holding in Young. The ordinance in Renton,
Washington was similar to Detroit's regulations, but whereas the Young
Court conceded that the ordinances were content-based, the Court in Renton
36. Id. at 54.
37. Id.
38. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and
Rehnquist. Justice Powell filed a separate concurring opinion. I& at 51.
39. Justice Stevens stated "that the ordinances treat adult theaters differently from other
theaters and ... the classification is predicated on the content of material shown in the respective
theaters." Id. at 63.
40. Young, 427 U.S. at 70. Justice Stevens continued to state that "every schoolchild can
understand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual
Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Id.
41. Marcus, supra note 3, at 8.
42. Young, 427 U.S. at 56 n.12.
43. Id at 62.
44. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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expressly adopted a content-neutral time, place, and manner analysis.4s
The Court deemed the ordinance to be content-neutral because it was "not
aimed at the content of the films shown at 'adult motion picture theaters,'
but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding
community. '
Furthermore, the Court held that Renton was not obligated to conduct
its own studies in order to justify enacting the ordinance for the purpose of
"promot[ing] the City of Renton's great interest in protecting and preserv-
ing the quality of its neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality
of urban life through effective land use planning."47 Renton was entitled
to rely on the experiences of other metropolitan cities, even though Renton
was a much smaller municipality. 4 The City Council of Renton decided,
relying on the experiences of Seattle, Detroit and other cities, that the
presence of adult theaters would result in crime and urban blight within the
surrounding neighborhoods.49
Finally, the Court in Renton greatly relaxed the required showing by
a municipality of reasonable alternative avenues of communication under
the time, place, and manner test."0 In Renton, the land area where adult
businesses were permitted consisted of approximately five percent of the
city's total land area. However, existing businesses occupied some of the
land in question, and much of the undeveloped land was not for sale or
lease at that time."1 Respondents contended that there were no "commer-
cially viable" sites in which to open and operate an adult business.52 The
Court dismissed the contention, stating the fact that "respondents must fend
for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other
prospective purchasers and lessees, does not give rise to a First Amendment
violation."53 Although a city must refrain from suppressing lawful speech,
it is not compelled "to ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds of
45. 1d at 47.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 58-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 51. Renton was a city of approximately 32,000 people, and at the time the
ordinance was enacted, there was no evidence that any adult movie theaters were located in the
city. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. The city's purpose in enacting the ordinance was added only
after the lawsuit began. Prior to the amendment, there was no mention of the ordinance being
designed to address any secondary effects an adult theatre might create. Id. at 58-59 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 53-54.
51. Id. at 53.
52. Id.
53. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
ZONING OF ADULT BUSINESSES
speech-related businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at
bargain prices."'
IH1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts of City of National City v. Wiener
National City is located approximately five miles from downtown
San Diego."s Only 3196 acres, or 58% of the city's land, are available for
any purpose. The city contains a large naval installation that occupies 787
acres of the city's available land. 6 Only 572 acres, or 17.9% of its total
net acres, are zoned for commercial use.'7
In December 1986, Steven D. Wiener opened Chuck's Bookstore,
an adult bookstore and arcade."8 Wiener had previously operated another
bookstore within the city, but it was closed by the city during redevelop-
ment.59 During the three years in which Chuck's Bookstore operated at
the second location, there was continual tension between Wiener and the
residents of the surrounding community.' The city had filed various
suits-both civil and criminal-to force the store's closure, but Chuck's
Bookstore continued to operate.6'
When Wiener opened Chuck's Bookstore in 1986, there was a city
ordinance in effect which prohibited an adult business from operating
within 1500 feet of another adult business, 1500 feet of a school or public
park, or 1000 feet of any residentially zoned property.' The city enacted
54. Id.
55. City of National City v. Wiener, 838 P.2d 223, 225 (Cal. 1992).
56. ld.
57. Id,
58. Id.
59. Id. at 225 n.l.
60. Pam Lopez-Johnson, National City's Brick Row; Neighbors Wage Limited War on Adult
Bookstore, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1988. at B9 (San Diego County Ed.). Wiener reported that
"It]here have been tires cut behind the store and the trash has been set on fire. Someone came
here one night and burned up a car, but I've never seen the police help." Id.
61. ld. In 1989, Wiener was convicted in a criminal court for "having doors on stalls that
show pornographic movies." He was sentenced to 30 days in jail and fined $1000. After the
verdict, Wiener removed the doors on the stalls and continued to operate. Id.
62. National City, 838 P.2d at 225 n.3. Relevant portions of the ordinance provide:
A. No person or entity shall own, establish, operate, control or enlarge, or cause or permit
the establishment, operation, enlargement or transfer of ownership or control, except pursuant to
Section 18.69.060, of any of the following adult entertainment establishments if such adult
entertainment establishment is within one thousand five hundred feet of another adult
entertainment establishment or within one thousand five hundred feet of any school or public park
19941
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the ordinance as part of its comprehensive scheme of urban redevelop-
ment.Y Before enacting the ordinance, the city had performed a study and
conducted public hearings before the city's Planning Commission." The
study showed that National City had the second highest crime rate in San
Diego County, and that "urban decay [was] rife throughout the city.""
The city also employed "strip zoning," which consists of commercial
zoning on either side of heavily trafficked streets.' Thus, commercial
zones were generally in close proximity to residential areas. As a result,
only 4.5 of the 572 commercially zoned acres were located more than 1000
feet from a residential area.67  These 4.5 acres were located in the
southern part of the city, which was then occupied in part by a 9000-
square-foot building and a motorcycle shop. 
6
The city's ordinance also contained a provision enabling an adult
business to operate despite the 1000-foot distance requirement if located in
a retail shopping center.69 To qualify under this exception, the adult
business had to be isolated from direct view of public streets and resi-
dentially zoned property.70 Portions of three existing malls satisfied the
ordinance's requirements under this exception.71
B. Procedural History
Shortly after the opening of Chuck's Bookstore, National City
brought an action in superior court seeking a preliminary and permanent
within the city or within one thousand feet of any residentially zoned property in the city,
measured along street frontages:
1. Adult bookstore; ...
3. Adult mini-motion picture arcade (peep shows); ...
Id.
63. National City, 838 P.2d at 226.
64. I
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id
68. National City, 838 P.2d at 226.
69. Id. The shopping mall exception in the ordinance reads as follows:
C. Nothing in this chapter prohibits the location of adult entertainment establishments
within retail shopping centers in all commercial zones wherein such activities will have their only
frontage upon enclosed malls or malls isolated from direct view from public streets, parks,
schools, churches or residentially zoned property.
Id. at 225-26 n.3.
70. National City, 838 P.2d at 226.
71. Id
ZONING OF ADULT BUSINESSES
injunction against the continued operation of Chuck's Bookstore. The
city claimed that the bookstore constituted a common law nuisance," and
that the bookstore was in violation of National City's recently enacted
ordinance.74 Wiener conceded that Chuck's Bookstore was in violation
of the city ordinance's 1000-foot residential separation but claimed that the
ordinance was unconstitutional.S
After a three-day trial, the superior court granted the city's request
for a permanent injunction against Chuck's Bookstore's operating at its
current location.76 The court found that the ordinance was a reasonable
"time, place, and manner" regulation designed to serve a substantial
government interest." The court further found that the ordinance provided
reasonable alternative avenues of communication."8
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision,
concluding that the ordinance failed to provide reasonable alternate avenues
of communication and thus constituted "an impermissible restriction on
protected speech."7 9  The court found that the distance requirements
afforded too few alternative sites at which to locate an adult business.' °
It also found that the opportunity of locating within an enclosed mall was
"illusive" because of "the apparent aversion shopping mall landlords have
toward the presence of adult entertainment shops on the premises," and that
the construction of a new shopping center "would not be economically
feasible for the typical adult business entrepreneur."'"
On October 29, 1992, the Supreme Court of California, in a 5-2
decision, reversed the judgment of the court of appeal, remanding the
matter with instructions to reinstate the trial court's judgment.'
72. l d at 225.
73. Although National City's action was for both statutory violations and common law public
nuisance, the superior court based its decision solely on the statutory violation. On appeal, the
appellate court also addressed only the statutory violation. Id at 225 n.2.
74. Id at 225.
75. National City, 838 P.2d at 225-26.
76. Id. at 227.
77. Id
78. Id
79. Id
80. National City, 838 P.2d at 227.
81. Id
82. Id at 234.
1994]
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IV. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
The California Supreme Court, defining the issue on appeal as
"whether a zoning ordinance that combines both distance regulations and
an exception for location of adult businesses in certain shopping malls
conforms with First Amendment principles under the standard set forth in
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.." upheld National City's ordinance
as constitutional. 3 The court stated that it was guided in its analysis by
both Young and Renton." While acknowledging that the appellate court
cited both U.S. Supreme Court cases, it concluded that the appellate court
had "failed to apply their express language or heed their underlying
rationale."'
Since the National City ordinance, like the one in Renton, did not
ban adult businesses entirely, but merely placed limitations on where an
adult business could be located, the court held the ordinance was properly
analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation. 6 The court
further determined that the ordinance was content-neutral because it was
aimed at the "secondary effects of adult businesses" on the surrounding
community, rather than the content of the materials sold.' The court
dismissed the respondent's contention that the predominant purpose behind
the ordinance was to prohibit the establishment of any adult business,
relying on the testimony of the city's Planning Director that the city was
unaware of any reluctance on the part of landowners to rent to adult
businesses."8 The court also described the expert testimony of the
respondent as "generalized, speculative evidence." s9
Finding the ordinance to be content-neutral, the court proceeded to
analyze its constitutionality under the two-part Renton test.90 The court
found that the ordinance served a substantial governmental interest based
on the city's evidence presented at trial "that adult businesses are a source
of urban decay."'" The distance regulation and shopping center exception
were also held to serve substantial governmental interests "in decreasing
blight and crime, [and] shifting part of the regulatory burden to the private
83. it4 at 225.
84. Id. at 228.
85. National City, 838 P.2d at 228.
86. Id. at 231.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id at 231 n.8.
90. National City, 838 P.2d at 232.
91. Id
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sector."92 Although the written stated purpose of the ordinance93 was
inconsistent with the shopping center exception, which would allow a
concentration of adult businesses, the court failed to address this problem
because respondents did not specifically raise this contention, especially at
the trial level. 4
The court also concluded that the ordinance provided reasonable
alternate avenues of communication because, with the inclusion of the
shopping center exception, it "makes available the eritire commercially
zoned area of the city... on which to locate an adult business.""5 The
court noted that there were vacancies at all three shopping centers, and that
the evidence of landowners' unwillingness to rent "consisted essentially of
generalized responses by leasing agents to respondents' expert's telephone
inquiry."" It then entirely dismissed the issue by stating that even
conclusive evidence of landowners' unwillingness to rent would not be
"dispositive of the issue of whether the ordinance provides a reasonable
opportunity for such businesses to locate within National City."'
In taking this stance, the court relied on Renton's rejection of an
economic viability standard for determining whether an ordinance provides
reasonable alternate avenues of communication.98 The court viewed
respondent's contentions-that landowners were unwilling to rent to adult
businesses and that the cost of constructing a mall was prohibitive for a
small business owner-as mere economic considerations that have no place
in First Amendment analysis. 9 The court stated that "[wihile a city may
not suppress protected speech, neither is it compelled to act as a broker or
leasing agent for those engaged in the sale of it""
92. Id
93. "Trhe written stated purpose of the ordinance is to 'prevent problems of blight and
deterioration which accompany and are brought about by the concentration of adult entertainment
establishments."' Id. at 231 n.7 (emphasis added).
94. National City, 838 P.2d at 231 n.7.
95. Id. at 233.
96. Id
97. Id.
98. Id. at 229. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54; Young, 427 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring).
99. National City, 838 P.2d at 233-34.
100. Id. at 233. The court further stated that "[the Constitution does not saddle municipali-
ties with the task of ensuring either the popularity or economic success of adult businesses." Id
at 234.
1994]
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. National City's Reason For Enacting The Ordinance
At first glance, under Renton's lax standards,'0 ' it seems that
National City provides sufficient evidence that its purpose in enacting the
ordinance was to battle an important governmental interest-the negative
effects caused by adult establishments." 2  This stated reason closely
mirrors those contained in ordinances in both Young and Renton. However,
there are some inconsistencies both in National City's ostensible purpose
and the court's support of the city's stated purpose.
1. Content-Neutrality
The first question to be answered under the Renton test is whether
the ordinance is a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.
0 3
The stated purpose of the ordinance is to "prevent problems of blight and
deterioration which accompany and are brought about by the concentration
of adult entertainment establishments." 4 However, as the majority
concedes, the shopping mall exception would allow just such a concentra-
tion that the ordinance seeks to avoid.' 5 There is no limit placed on the
number of adult entertainment establishments that may open up in any one
shopping mall. The ordinance is judged content-neutral because it focuses
on the secondary effects of adult establishments," 5 but there is a serious
question as to whether the ordinance actually addresses such effects. In
response, the court claims respondent never mentioned that the written
statement of the ordinance failed to conform with the shopping mall
exception, and thus concludes, without more said, that the stated purpose
supports a substantial government purpose."°
The court relies heavily on the "familiar principle of constitutional
law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute
on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."0 8 While this may
be true, the inconsistency between the ordinance's stated purpose and its
101. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
103. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
104. National City, 838 P.2d at 231 n.7 (emphasis added).
105. Id
106. Id at 231.
107. Id at 231 n.7.
108. Id. at 231 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)).
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provision allowing a concentration of adult establishments within certain
shopping malls adds weight to the respondent's claim that the predominant
censorial purpose behind enacting the ordinance was prohibiting the
establishment of such businesses."°  This inconsistency also raises
questions as to whether National City has a substantial governmental
interest in passing this particular ordinance, as will be discussed below." °
Therefore, the court should at least seriously address this issue. In part, the
court appears satisfied with such a cursory analysis of content-neutrality
because it believes there to be sufficient alternate avenues of communica-
tion, although there is a strong question as to whether such alternatives
actually exist."'
2. Substantial Governmental Interest
Once the court finds that the ordinance is a time, place, and manner
regulation, it must determine whether the ordinance is designed to serve a
substantial governmental interest." 2 The court finds this prong of the test
"easily satisfied" because the distance regulation and shopping center
exception are said to help decrease blight.1 3 However, the discrepancy
between the stated purpose to prevent concentration and the shopping center
exception allowing such concentration once again becomes an issue.
The court defends the trial court's finding of a substantial govern-
mental interest by stressing two main justifications raised by National City,
neither of which succeeds in clearing up the discrepancy. First, by
allowing adult businesses to operate in a permissible mall, the court states
that they will be isolated from the public, "placing them in a location where
they do not affect the moral climate of the community as a whole."14
However, as Justice Mosk states in his dissent, this clearly is not the reason
for including the shopping mall exception. He points out that a "family-
oriented shopping mall, with small children wandering about and adoles-
cents congregating after school," would be the last place in which the city
would wish an adult bookstore to be established.1 5 If anything, the
shopping center exception would seem counter-productive to the city's
109. National City, 838 P.2d at 231.
110. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 119-47 and accompanying text.
112. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
113. National City, 838 P.2d at 232.
114. I
115. Id at 241 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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stated purpose of reducing the secondary effects caused by adult establish-
ments.
Second, the court states that placing adult businesses in shopping
centers promotes the city's interest by shifting the regulatory burden to the
owners of the shopping centers.1 6 A shopping center, the court notes,
generally "exercises a high degree of control over its tenants" and
"addresses such factors as hours of operation, parking, and security."
17
However, these stated reasons contradict other statements of the court. In
its analysis of alternate sites, the court relies on the fact that the ordinance
does not limit the number of adult bookstores "nor the hours they may
operate.""'  At one point, the court describes the ordinance as very
unrestrictive. Later, when necessary, the court defends a finding of a
substantial interest because the very same ordinance allows adult bookstores
to be heavily regulated, including, in particular, their hours of operation.
The court wants it both ways, thus leaving the true purpose behind the
enactment of the ordinance in doubt.
B. Reasonable Alternate Avenues of Communication
The final prong of the Renton test requires that the city leave
available to adult establishments reasonable alternative avenues of
communication." 9  This section of the analysis certainly reveals the
greatest weaknesses in the court's reasoning. There are critical distinctions
between the facts in National City and those in Renton. The court does not
effectively handle these distinctions, and thus fails to successfully counter
any of the three contentions raised by the respondent.
1. Lack of Sites Currently for Rent
It is important to initially draw some distinctions between the facts
of National City and those of Renton. The Supreme Court in Renton
upheld the ordinance in question, but the ordinance contained only a
dispersal stipulation. It still left "some 520 acres, or more than five percent
of the entire land area" open, consisting of "[aimple, accessible real estate,
including acreage in all stages of development."'' " Renton thus did not
116. Id at 232.
117. Id
118. National City, 838 P.2d at 226 (emphasis added).
119. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
120. Id. at 53.
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limit adult establishments to particular physical facilities. Within those 520
acres, "an adult bookstore owner was free to build or buy a small mom.-
and-pop store, for example."'
Renton prevents a city "from effectively denying respondents a
reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the
city."" The city of Renton did not use its zoning power as a pretext for
suppressing constitutionally protected expression."n However, as the
majority in National City acknowledges, the particular way in which the
city created its commercial zoning leaves only 4.5 of the 572 commercially
zoned acres outside the distance requirements. 4 The city's planning
director testified that the distance requirements, viewed by themselves,
imposed a de facto ban." 5
There is a good indication that without the shopping center
exception, the ordinance would be deemed unconstitutional. Absent this
exception, it is almost certain that an adult bookstore could not open
anywhere within the city. In Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whit-
tier, 6 the Ninth Circuit stressed that "'merely mimicking the ordinance
upheld in [Young] is not enough." '' V The Ninth Circuit stressed that the
ordinance in Young allowed "myriad locations" in which an adult business
could operate, and the "burden on First amendment rights is slight."'
'
But the court went on to say that there is little doubt that the majority in
Young would not uphold an ordinance putting all theatres out of business,
and that there is no indication in the Renton opinion that the Court would
uphold such an ordinance either.
9
Thus, the shopping center "exception," which the majority in
National City views as allowing "a greater number of alternative sites for
adult businesses,"'30 is in reality the only possibility. From the outset of
its analysis, the court fails to accept the fact that the provision allowing
adult establishments to locate in certain malls is, in fact, at the core of the
regulation. This failure is especially pertinent, for it enables the court to
121. National City, 838 P.2d at 240 (Mosk, ., concurring and dissenting).
122. Renton. 475 U.S. at 54.
123. Id.
124. National City, 838 P.2d at 226. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 238 (Mosk, 3., concurring and dissenting).
126. 861 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988).
127. Id. at 1109 (quoting Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1213 (5th Cir.
1982)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1110.
130. National City, 838 P.2d at 226 (emphasis added).
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avoid the higher level of scrutiny which would be required if the shopping
center "exception" was viewed as the only real possibility of opening an
adult establishment within the city.
31
2. Unwillingness of Owners of Available
Sites to Rent to Adult Establishments
Absent a realistic opportunity of opening an adult establishment
outside the distance restrictions, anyone wishing to open such an adult
establishment is left with two choices: locating rental property within an
existing mall satisfying the shopping center exception, or financing the
construction of a new mall. However, as will be seen, neither of these two
are reasonable options.
The majority concedes that only three existing malls were identified
as fulfilling the enclosed mall requirement.' Furthermore, only 5000 to
6000 feet of space at one center and 12,000 feet at another center met the
ordinance's requirements.' 33 Thus, even if the owners of these malls
were willing to rent to an adult business, it would leave much less than the
entire 572 commercially zoned acres which the court suggests to be
available."M
However, Wiener presented strong evidence at trial that the owners
of these three malls were unwilling to rent to an adult business. 35 The
court refuses to address this serious contention, labeling the evidence of the
landowner's unwillingness to rent as nothing more than "generalized
responses by leasing agents.' 36  But what stronger evidence does the
court require? The expert witness for the respondent contacted each of the
three existing malls and was told in no uncertain terms that they would not
rent to an adult bookstore."3 The lease at the second mall he visited
even contained a provision forbidding the mall from leasing to such a busi-
ness. 3 If the expert witness had only contacted a sampling of the
available rental sites, his findings could possibly be deemed inconclusive,
but that simply was not the case here. Even the trial court seemed to
accept the evidence as solid, leading to its rhetorical remark: "'Is there any
131. See infra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
132. National City, 838 P.2d at 226.
133. Id at 227.
134. Id. at 226.
135. Id at 239 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
136. Id. at 233.
137. National City, 838 P.2d at 239 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
138. Id
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question in your mind that not in a million years would Plaza Bonita, or
T & C, or South Bay Plaza rent to Mr. Wiener... ?,,,3
Perhaps realizing the true strength of the evidence, the court reverts
to an even more absurd stance, arguing that "any reluctance or outright
refusal of private land owners to rent to adult businesses [is not] dispositive
of the issue of whether the ordinance provides a reasonable opportunity for
such businesses to locate within National City."'" This statement makes
absolutely no sense. A total denial bans any opportunity, much less a
reasonable one. The court might have been correct if obtaining a location
in a mall were a true alternative, rather than an adult bookstore's only
possibility. 4 But once again, the court convinces itself that nonexistent
"alternatives" are available.
3. Cost of Building a Shopping Center in
Compliance With the City Ordinance
Barring an opportunity to locate on the street or rent in an existing
mall, building a mall would be the only possibility one would have to open
an adult business within National City. The court once again fails to accept
as conclusive expert testimony by the respondent regarding the prohibitive
cost of such an undertaking, 42 and once again, it is difficult to understand
why. Respondent's expert witness was a redevelopment consultant with 40
years of experience in shopping mall development." He testified that
it would cost $6.5 million to build an appropriate mall and would require
from two to five years merely to assemble the property and obtain
financing."
Clearly this is not a reasonable option that would satisfy the Renton
requirements. The money required is an exorbitant amount for a small
business owner, although the majority would claim this is an impermissible
economic consideration not allowed under Renton. 45 Furthermore, more
than half a decade's wait in order to open an adult establishment seems
well beyond a reasonable period. At what length of time would the
majority no longer view this as an "alternative"? As the Ninth Circuit
139. Id (citations omitted).
140. Id at 233.
141. See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
142. National City, 838 P.2d at 227.
143. Id at 239 (Mosk, ., concurring and dissenting).
144. Id
145. See infra notes 148-61 and accompanying text.
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stated, "[a]ny loss of First Amendment freedoms, even briefly, can
constitute irreparable injury."'" If so, there can be no doubt that a five-
year delay on constitutionally protected expression would be a devastating
blow.
Finally, the court's suggestion--once again-that the building of
one's own mall is but one more option available under the ordinance is
plainly incorrect. The majority has, in fact, left an adult bookstore without
any reasonable options. The Supreme Court in Renton stated that the city
of Renton did not use the ordinance to suppress free speech, but rather
sought "to make some areas available for adult theaters and their patrons,
while at the same time preserving the quality of life in the communi-
ty." 47 One might ask the majority in National City exactly what area has
the city left available in which to open an adult business?
C. Economic Analysis
One major factor influencing the majority's opinion, especially in its
analysis of reasonable alternative avenues of communication, is the
Supreme Court's assertion in Renton that "[t]he inquiry for First Amen-
dment purposes is not concerned with economic impact."'" However,
the majority in National City grossly misapplies the Supreme Court's
reasoning.
The Supreme Court in Renton, in making the above assertion, was
responding to the Ninth Circuit's acceptance of the district court's finding
that a substantial part of the 520 acres on which an adult business could be
located were occupied by existing businesses.' The Ninth Circuit found
that limiting adult theater uses to those areas was a substantial restriction
on speech. 5' The Supreme Court, however, rejected the conclusion made
by the Ninth Circuit that the existence of competing commercial businesses
imposed a substantial restriction on speech.' The Court stated that
"respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an
equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees," rejecting that
government must "ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech-
146. Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Lydo Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 1984)).
147. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
148. Id. (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring)).
149. Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).
150. l at 534.
151. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
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related businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at bargain
prices.s
152
The Renton Court was asserting that no business is guaranteed a
place to do business within a locality, but only that it must have a
reasonable opportunity of doing so. However, the Court did not intend to
allow a city to ban an adult business from its municipality because the
Court also stated that a city must "refrain from effectively denying
respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater
within the city."' The ordinance in Renton did not limit the location of
adult businesses to specific facilities, and the Court felt secure that an adult
business had a reasonable opportunity to open a store, as it had access to
'[a]mple, accessible real estate,' including 'acreage in all stages of
development.'
That particular set of facts differs substantially from the one
presented in National City. Respondents contend, not that bargain
locations are unavailable, but that no locations are available. The result of
the ordinance in National City is a complete and total ban of all adult
business uses within the city.'55
The limitations facing respondent in National City are not mere
economic concerns. An adult business has no access to rent commercial
space within the city. This limitation results not from fair competition with
other businesses, but from a complete denial from the only three viable
shopping centers in the city.'5" 6 In addition, the cost of building one's
own mall is not a mere economic problem, but a completely exorbitant and
unrealistic "alternative" to locating on the street."
If an adult bookstore were given a realistic number of acres from
which to choose or a fair number of malls from which to possibly rent, but
was unable to locate a site at a price enabling it to operate a lucrative
business, it would have no complaint. Such a situation would truly be its
own economic concern, unrelated to the suppression of First Amendment
guarantees, as suggested by the California Supreme Court.1
5 8
However, unlike the situation in Renton, respondent only has access
to 4.5 acres beyond the ordinance's distance requirement, none of which is
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 53 (citations omitted).
155. See supra notes 119-47 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
158. National City, 838 P.2d at 233-34.
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really available, 59 and is presented with illusive "alternatives" to locate
within an approved shopping mall. 60 Therefore, National City's
ordinance does effectively deny "a reasonable opportunity to open and
operate an adult theater within the city," and provides no opportunity to
obtain "[a]mple, accessible real estate."' 6 Respondent's contention, that
the ordinance suppresses constitutionally protected speech, is a valid one,
and is not an improper attempt to employ an impermissible economic
viability standard.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO INTERPRETING
RENTON'S EcONOMIC ANALYSIS
A misapplication of Renton's economic analysis is largely responsible
for the California Supreme Court's holding in National City. Fortunately,
there is case law illustrating the possiblity of taking another interpretive
approach to the precedent set forth in Renton. Most notably, two cases
decided in the Ninth Circuit-Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whit-
tier 162 and Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,'63 relying, in
part, upon the approach adopted in the Fifth Circuit-illustrate a sound
application of the Renton test. Taken together, these cases offer a
straightforward, workable test to determine whether an adult business is
truly offered a reasonable opportunity to locate within a municipality
employing a restrictive ordinance. This approach also strongly suggests
that the outcome of National City would have been very different if the
case had been litigated in federal court.
A. Ninth Circuit's Clarification of Renton's
Test of Reasonable Alternatives
The Ninth Circuit accepts that, under the Renton test, purely
commercial viability considerations are not a factor, but points out that the
Supreme Court has not stated what sorts of factors may be considered when
deciding whether relocation sites provided by a city are reasonable.'
64
The Ninth Circuit clarifies Renton on two very important issues: (1) how
159. See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
161. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 53.
162. 861 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988).
163. 989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993).
164. Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1529.
ZONING OF ADULT BUSINESSES
to handle the Court's prohibition on considering economic injury in deter-
mining whether a zoning restriction is unconstitutionally restrictive, and (2)
how to accurately determine the amount of alternative sites that are actually
available.
1. Permissible vs. Impermissible Economic Considerations
The Ninth Circuit asserts that the distinction between what is
economically unsuitable, and what is physically or practically unsuitable,
is difficult to maintain." The court states that it is very easy to couch
"[n]early all forms of physical and legal unsuitability,"' " which a court
may properly consider, "in terms of economic unsuitability," which the
Court has ruled to be impermissible.' 7 This can be seen very clearly in
National City, where the court rejects respondent's valid claims of
unconstitutional limitations by labeling them mere economic consider-
ations.
168
The Ninth Circuit unravels the confusion by asserting that "[t]he
Court [in Renton] obviously contemplated that there was a 'market' in
which businesses could purchase or lease real property on which business
could be conducted."'" In other words, a viable market must exist in
which an adult business can truly "fend for themselves in the real estate
market, on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers and
lessees."' 70  Although Renton stresses that the First Amendment only
requires a relocation site to be "potentially available rather than actually
165. Id.
166. Id. The Fifth Circuit, upon which the Ninth Circuit partly relies in developing its test,
holds that land "with physical characteristics that render it unavailable for any kind of
development, or legal characteristics that exclude adult businesses, may not be considered
'available' for constitutional purposes under Renton." Woodall v. City of El Paso, 959 F.2d 1305,
1306 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
167. Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1529.
168. The Fifth Circuit recently struck down jury instructions, which consisted essentially of
quoted portions of the Renton decision, because they were considered to be too confusing.
Woodall v. City of El Paso, 950 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1992). The court stated that the "jury could
easily take to mean all land made available to appellants is to be considered reasonable." Id. at
261. The jury in the trial court had concluded that 565 acres of desert that did not have roads,
utilities, and structures qualified as a reasonable alternative avenue of communication for an adult
business. Id. at 261-62.
169. Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Woodall v. City of El Paso, 959 F.2d 1305, 1306
(5th Cir. 1992)). The quote from Woodall continued: "A real estate market that provides no
opportunity to compete cannot provide a reasonable opportunity to do so." Woodall, 959 F.2d at
1306.
170. Woodall, 959 F.2d at 1306 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 54).
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available, the requirement of potentiality connotes genuine possibility.' '7
In considering whether a particular site provided to a business may be
considered part of the market, the court must employ a test of reasonable-
ness. 172 Relevant factors in determining whether a site is reasonably a
part of the market include its physical characteristics and "the cost of
altering or developing... its physical characteristics."'7'
Thus, the Ninth Circuit determines whether a relocation site is
reasonable, rather than employing confusing and easily manipulatable
categories such as "economic" and "non-economic" considerations. The
Ninth Circuit is concerned with whether the city provides genuine
possibilities of locating an adult business within the city. If permitted
relocation areas contain "no 'impediments' except for the possibility that
as a 'matter of business judgment' these relocation sites [are] undesir-
able,"' 4 then they can truly be considered part of the market available to
adult businesses.
2. Reasonableness of Number of Alternate Sites Provided
Once identifying which sites are reasonably to be considered part of
the available "market," the court must determine whether the remaining
available sites are sufficient to provide an adult business with a reasonable
opportunity to relocate. 75 The court does not consider this question in
the abstract, however, but strives to find the actual "number of potential
sites the ordinance leaves available for the location of adult business-
es."'76 This avoids vague assertions that adequate sites remain, without
a solid finding, as practiced by the California Supreme Court in National
City.
The Ninth Circuit offers some very valuable guidelines in making
this determination. A stipulation enforcing a separation requirement
between adult businesses, for example, makes the case "vastly different
from Renton," where no such stipulation existed.'" Once an adult
business locates in one area, it creates a further prohibitive zone, reducing
171. Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1531 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 1530.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061, 1071 (N.D. Tex. 1986)
(emphasis added)).
175. Id at 1532.
176. Walnut, 861 F.2d at 1108.
177. Id at 1109.
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the availability of remaining locations."' A rough estimation of the total
acreage is next to meaningless, therefore, and a court must look to "how
that acreage is dispersed throughout the City." '79 The Ninth Circuit also
considers it relevant if the effect of enforcing a city ordinance "would then
be a total exclusion of adult theaters in the City."'1 0
B. Outcome of National City Under
the Ninth Circuit's Approach
1. Land Sites Considered Within the Market
Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, one can quickly eliminate all of
the California Supreme Court's "alternate locations." The option to open
a business within an approved shopping mall"8' can now easily be seen
as illusive. Since none of the three malls are willing to rent to an adult
business, this option does not provide a genuine possibility, even though the
city claims them as potential sites."s  Thus, the three existing malls
would not be considered part of the relevant market in which an adult
business could rent.
The option of building one's own malls would also not be
considered a reasonable alternative. The cost of altering or developing an
area is a permissible factor to be considered under the Ninth Circuit's
approach.'"' Expert witness for the respondent in National City testified
that constructing a suitable mall would cost $6.5 million.ls 5 It seems safe
to say that the Ninth Circuit would deem such a financial burden to
178. Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1533.
179. Walnut, 861 F.2d at 1108.
180. Id. at 1107. In Walnut, the Ninth Circuit held that a city ordinance that left 99.5
commercially zoned acres available and contained a 1000-foot separation requirement between
adult businesses constituted an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. Walnut, 861 F.2d at
1113. In Topanga, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court was within its discretion in
determining that a city ordinance providing 7440.9 acres as realistically available for the location
of an adult business, only 0.18% of which was located in a commercial zone, and containing a
1000-foot separation requirement between adult business, would place a serious hardship on such
businesses. Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1533.
181. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
182. Under the Fifth Circuit's approach, a lease provision which forbid subletting to an adult
business would be classified as a legal restriction, and such a location would be considered
unavailable land. See Woodall, 959 F.2d at 1306.
183. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
184. Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1530.
185. National City, 838 P.2d at 239 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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preclude a genuine opportunity of opening an adult business. Therefore,
under the Ninth Circuit's approach, all land within 1000 feet of a residen-
tially-zoned area would not be considered part of the relevant market in
which an adult business could operate.
2. Reasonableness of Number of Available
Sites Within the Market
The only land remaining within the market would be the 4.5 acres
which the city calculates to be beyond the 1000-foot distance requirement.
However, National City's ordinance also proscribes a 1500-foot separation
requirement between adult btlsinesses, which substantially reduces the
number of potential sites within the available land. Because these 4.5 acres
are all located in the southern part of the city, most of the land would be
consumed by the buffer zone surrounding each adult business. 16 The
actual number of relocation sites available to Chuck's Bookstore dwindles
to very few, if any at all.
Under the Ninth Circuit's test, National City's ordinance would easily
be held as violative of the First Amendment protection on free speech. To
uphold the California Supreme Court's assertion that there are adequate
alternatives available for free expression would, as stated by the Ninth
Circuit, "make a mockery of First Amendment protections and would
render meaningless the Supreme Court's admonition that an ordinance must
not 'effectively den[y] ... a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an
adult theater within the city."'""
VII. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's decision in National City is an
ominous warning for anyone wishing to establish an adult business within
the state. The effect of National City's ordinance is a complete ban on the
establishment of any adult business within the city. It is not difficult to
imagine that other municipalities will soon pattern similar regulations.
The California Supreme Court goes much farther in eroding First
Amendment protections for adult businesses than does the United States
Supreme Court. Although Renton severely limited the constitutional rights
accorded to adult businesses, the Supreme Court very strongly cautioned
that a municipality could not effectively ban an adult business' opportunity
186. See Walnut, 861 F.2d at 1108.
187. Id at 1109 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54).
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of opening up within a city. This is precisely what National City's
ordinance accomplishes, and it receives the full approval from the highest
court in California.
This approach does not simply threaten free expression through erotic
material. While today the court has limited its withdrawal of First
Amendment protections to adult businesses, the ultimate threat to constitu-
tional protections could ultimately be much greater. If this minimal (some
may argue practically non-existent) scrutiny is justified by the supposedly
less important value of erotic material, how will this precedent ultimately
effect certain religious and political ideas that society and the courts feel are
deserving of less constitutional protection?
Fortunately, not all courts have taken a virtually hands-off approach
to First Amendment violations as practiced upon adult businesses--es-
pecially as evidenced by the analysis taken by the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit, working within the precedent set by the Supreme Court, offers an
approach that ensures that adult businesses will not be stripped completely
of First Amendment protections. One can hope that if National City, or
some similar case, is considered by the Supreme Court, the Court will
clarify its standard once and for all so as to ensure that future decisions
such as the one in National City will not occur.
In the meantime, as practical advice to prospective adult business
owners in California who can afford to form a corporation, it would be
wise to incorporate in a state outside of California. If these businesses are
sued in California state court, they can seek removal to federal court under
diversity jurisdiction. For the present, adjudication in federal court is the
only way that adult businesses can be assured of receiving any significant
constitutional protection.
Steven Ragona"
* The author dedicates this Note to his parents in appreciation for their years of love and
support.
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